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Abstract
Nonlocality, one of the most remarkable aspects of quantummechanics,
is closely related to Bayesian game theory. Quantum mechanics can offer
advantages to some Bayesian games, if the payoff functions are related to
Bell inequalities in some way. Most of these Bayesian games that have
been discussed are common interest games. Recently the first conflicting
interest Bayesian game is proposed in Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401
(2015). In the present paper we present three new conflicting interest
Bayesian games where quantum mechanics offers advantages. The first
game is linked with Cereceda inequalities, the second game is linked with
a generalized Bell inequality with 3 possible measurement outcomes, and
the third game is linked with a generalized Bell inequality with 3 possible
measurement settings.
Keywords: Bayesian game, nonlocal game, Bell inequalities.
1 Introduction
Nonlocality is one of the most remarkable aspects of quantum mechanics. It can
generate quantum correlation between two remote observers which are stronger
than classical correlation explained by local hidden variables. The readers can
refer to a recent review article [1] for a general overview of nonlocality. Inter-
estingly, it happens that this physics concept has something in common with
a concept of game theory, while quantum mechanics and game theory are two
seemingly disparate subjects. It has been pointed out that Bell inequalities [2]
and Bayesian games [3] are closely related [4, 5, 6]. The Bell expression and
the expected payoff funciton have the same form so that if quantum mechanics
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Table 1: Payoff matrix of our first game.
B1 B2
A1
(2,1) (0,0) (0,0) (2,1)
(0,0) (1,2) (1,2) (0,0)
A2
(0,0) (1,2) (− 3
2
,− 3
2
) (0,0)
(2,1) (0,0) (0,0) (− 3
2
,− 3
2
)
breaks one specific Bell inequality, it can generate nonlocal correlation between
the players and gives the corresponding expected payoff function a higher value.
Bayesian games that are related to Bell inequalities are often called “nonlocal
games” in the literature. The GHZ-Mermin game [7], the Magic Square game
[8, 9], the Hidden Matching game [10, 11] are all examples of nonlocal games.
In these nonlocal games the players have common interests.
Recently, Pappa et al. [12] present the first conflicting interest Bayesian
game in which quantum mechanics leads to a higher total payoff, and they
suggest that it would be interesting to find more conflicting interest games
where quantum mechanics offers an advantage. In the present paper we present
three new such games. The first game is linked with Cereceda inequalities [13],
the second game is linked with a generalized Bell inequality with 3 possible
measurement outcomes [14], and the third game is linked with a generalized
Bell inequality with 3 possible measurement settings [15].
2 A Bayesian Game Linked with Cereceda In-
equality
Let’s begin by describing our first game between two players. When the game
starts, each player will receive a random binary input. We use the notation
A1, A2 to denote the two possible values of Alice’s input and B1, B2 for Bob’s.
Each player knows her/his own input but not the other player’s input. (In
other words, the players have partial information about the setting in which the
game is played.) Each player then has to decide a binary output alone. We use
ai ∈ {0, 1} to denote Alice’s output when her input is Ai, and bi ∈ {0, 1} for
Bob’s output. So we can regard a1a2 as Alice’s strategy, and b1b2 Bob’s. The
payoffs for them are determined by the inputs and the outputs. The mapping
can be described by payoff functions or payoff matrices. The payoff matrix of
our first game is given in Table 1. The two inputs AiBj fix a 2 × 2 block and
the two outputs aibj ’s four possible values 00, 01, 10, 11 corresponds to the four
entries (from left to right, up to down) of the block. Each entry is a tuple of
two values, the first value for Alice’s payoff and the second one for Bob’s. For
example, if Alice receives A1 and outputs 1, Bob receives B2 and outputs 0,
then Alice obtains payoff 1 and Bob obtains 2.
Because the inputs are random variables, we have to consider the expected
2
Table 2: Expected payoffs of our first game.
a1 a2 b1 b2 $A $B $A + $B Equilibrium
0 0 0 0 1/8 -1/8 0 no
0 0 0 1 1 1/2 3/2 no
0 0 1 0 -1/8 1/8 0 no
0 0 1 1 3/4 3/4 3/2 YES
0 1 0 0 1 1/2 3/2 YES
0 1 0 1 9/8 3/8 3/2 no
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 no
0 1 1 1 1/8 -1/8 0 no
1 0 0 0 -1/8 1/8 0 no
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 no
1 0 1 0 3/8 9/8 3/2 no
1 0 1 1 1/2 1 3/2 no
1 1 0 0 3/4 3/4 3/2 no
1 1 0 1 1/8 -1/8 0 no
1 1 1 0 1/2 1 3/2 YES
1 1 1 1 -1/8 1/8 0 no
payoffs. The expected payoff functions for Alice and Bob are
$A(a1a2b1b2) = Pr(A1B1)
(
2 · P 1100 + 1 · P 1111
)
+ Pr(A1B2)
(
2 · P 1201 + 1 · P 1210
)
+ Pr(A2B1)
(
1 · P 2101 + 2 · P 2110
)
+ Pr(A2B2)
(− 3
2
· P 2200 −
3
2
· P 2211
)
,
(1)
$B(a1a2b1b2) = Pr(A1B1)
(
1 · P 1100 + 2 · P 1111
)
+ Pr(A1B2)
(
1 · P 1201 + 2 · P 1210
)
+ Pr(A2B1)
(
2 · P 2101 + 1 · P 2110
)
+ Pr(A2B2)
(− 3
2
· P 2200 −
3
2
· P 2211
)
,
(2)
where
P ijkl =
{
1, ai = k and bj = l
0, otherwise.
(3)
We suppose the inputs are uniformly random and set Pr(AiBj) =
1
4
for all i, j.
We list all the 16 combinations of Alice’s and Bob’s possible outputs and the
corresponding expected payoffs in Table 2.
From Table 2 we can see that there are three equilibria. Equilibrium is a key
concept in game theory, which describes a stable state in which each player’s
output is the best response to the other player(s)’ output(s). For example,
$A(0011) is the largest of {$A(a1a211)|∀a1, a2} and $B(0011) is the largest of
{$B(00b1b2)|∀b1, b2} so the output 0011 is an equilibrium point. It’s a fair equi-
librium because $A(0011) = $B(0011). However, Alice prefers the equilibrium
0100 with payoff (1, 1
2
) while Bob prefers 1110 with payoff (1
2
, 1) because game
3
theory assumes the players are selfish and aim to maximize their own profits.
This game is a conflicting interest game because the two players cannot agree
on the same equilibrium. From the table we can also see that the largest total
payoff $A+$B is 3/2, even if randomness is incorporated in the decision process.
Randomness can be incorporated in the form of common advice. A probabil-
ity distribution on 16 output combinations has to be generated by an arbitrator
before the game starts. (So the distribution doesn’t depend on the inputs be-
cause the inputs are fed to the players after the game has started.) After the
game has started one combination a1a2b1b2 is sampled from the distribution by
the arbitrator and then delivered to the two players. Alice/Bob outputs ai/bj
if her/his input is Ai/Bj . With the help of advice their outputs may be cor-
related. For instance, the distribution Pr(a1a2b1b2 = 0000) = Pr(a1a2b1b2 =
1111) = 1
2
makes the players output the same random value, while the distribu-
tion Pr(a1a2b1b2 = 0011) = Pr(a1a2b1b2 = 1100) =
1
2
makes the players output
two different random values. In the case of playing the game with randomness,
the expected payoffs for Alice and Bob are
$A =
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
Pr(a1a2b1b2 = ijkl) · $A(ijkl)
=
1
4
(
2P 1100 + P
11
11 + 2P
12
01 + P
12
10 + P
21
01 + 2P
21
10 −
3
2
P 2200 −
3
2
P 2211
)
, (4)
$B =
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
Pr(a1a2b1b2 = ijkl) · $B(ijkl)
=
1
4
(
P 1100 + 2P
11
11 + P
12
01 + 2P
12
10 + 2P
21
01 + P
21
10 −
3
2
P 2200 −
3
2
P 2211
)
, (5)
where
P ijkl =
1∑
m,n=0
Pr(ai = k, bj = l, a3−i = m, b3−j = n) (6)
represents the probability of outputing kl given the inputs AiBj.
If we compare the above scenario with the Bell experiment [2], we can find
that A1, A2 can be regarded as Alice’s two types of measurements, a1, a2 as the
measurement outcomes, and analogously for B1, B2 and b1, b2, and then Eq. (4)
and (5) are actually Bell expressions. More interestingly, the total payoff
$A + $B =
3
4
(P 1111 + P
12
01 + P
21
10 − P 2211 ) +
3
4
(P 1100 + P
12
10 + P
21
01 − P 2200 ) (7)
is propotional to the left part of the sum of the following two Cereceda inequal-
ities [13]:
P 1111 + P
12
01 + P
21
10 − P 2211 6 1, (8)
P 1100 + P
12
10 + P
21
01 − P 2200 6 1. (9)
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Table 3: Payoff matrix of our second game.
B1 B2
A1
(2,1) (0,0) (0,0) (2,1) (0,0) (0,0)
(0,0) (3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0) (0,0) (3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0)
(0,0) (0,0) (1,2) (0,0) (0,0) (1,2)
A2
(0,0) (3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0) (2,1) (0,0) (0,0)
(0,0) (0,0) (3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0) (3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0)
(3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1,2)
The upper bound 1 is induced by local realism. Thus $A + $B 6
3
2
, congruent
with the largest total payoff in Table. 2.
However, probabilities generated by quantum mechanics can violate these in-
equalities. An appropriate choice of observables A1, A2, B1, B2 and a maximally
entangled state of two qubits can achieve
P 1111 + P
12
01 + P
21
10 − P 2211 =
1 +
√
2
2
> 1, (10)
P 1100 + P
12
10 + P
21
01 − P 2200 =
1 +
√
2
2
> 1. (11)
Here P ijkl are probabilities generated by quantum resource, not the same as
the probabilities generated by classical resource (Eq. (6)). Suppose the quan-
tum state is |φ〉, The eigenvectors of A1 and A2 are {|α10〉〈α10|, |α11〉〈α11|} and
{|α20〉〈α20|, |α21〉〈α21|}. The eigenvectors of B1 and B2 are {|β10〉〈β10 |, |β11〉〈β11 |}
and {|β20〉〈β20 |, |β21〉〈β21 |}. The probabilities can be given by
P ijkl = |〈αik, βjl |φ〉|2. (12)
1+
√
2
2
is the maximal violation allowed by quantum mechanics [16]. So players
with quantum resource can obtain $A+$B =
3
4
(1+
√
2) > 3
2
. At the same time,
$A = $B =
3
8
(1 +
√
2), a fair allocation is achieved.
3 A Bayesian Game with Ternary Outputs
In Ref. [12] the authors suggest that it would be interesting to find more conflict-
ing interest games where quantum mechanics offers an advantage, for example
when larger dimensions are used. In this section we explore the relation between
a 3 dimensional Bell inequality and a Bayesian game. In this case the outputs
of the Bayesian game are ternary rather than binary, i.e., ai, bi ∈ {0, 1, 2} for
i = 1, 2. The payoff matrix of our second game is given in Table 3. It is a
conflicting interest game, because Alice prefers equilibrium a1a2b1b2 = 0010
with payoff (11
8
, 7
8
) while Bob prefers equilibrium a1a2b1b2 = 2122 with payoff
(7
8
, 11
8
).
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The expected payoffs for Alice and Bob are
$A =
1
4
(2 · P 1100 +
3
2
· P 1111 + P 1122 + 2 · P 1200 +
3
2
· P 1211 + P 1222
+
3
2
· P 2101 +
3
2
· P 2112 +
3
2
· P 2120 + 2 · P 2200 +
3
2
· P 2211 + P 2222 ), (13)
$B =
1
4
(P 1100 +
3
2
· P 1111 + 2 · P 1122 + P 1200 +
3
2
· P 1211 + 2 · P 1222
+
3
2
· P 2101 +
3
2
· P 2112 +
3
2
· P 2120 + P 2200 +
3
2
· P 2211 + 2 · P 2222 ). (14)
The total payoff $A + $B is
3
4
C with
C =P 1100 + P
11
11 + P
11
22 + P
12
00 + P
12
11 + P
12
22
+ P 2101 + P
21
12 + P
21
20 + P
22
00 + P
22
11 + P
22
22 , (15)
which is the left part of a generalized Bell inequality C 6 3 [14]. Thus $A+$B 6
9
4
.
By choosing appropriate measurements on a maximally entangled state of
two qutrits, the players can achieve
C =
2
9 sin2( pi
12
)
> 3. (16)
So players with quantum resource can obtain $A+$B =
3
4
C = (6 sin2(pi/12))−1 >
9
4
. At the same time, $A = $B = (12 sin
2(pi/12))−1, a fair allocation is achieved.
4 A Bayesian Game with Ternary Inputs
In this section we present a Bayesian game with ternary inputs. The three
possible values of Alice’s input are denoted as A1, A2, A3, and the corresponding
outputs for each input value are denoted as a1, a2, a3. Analogously, the notations
for Bob’s input values and outputs are B1, B2, B3 and b1, b2, b3. The payoff
matrix of our third game is given in Table 4. It is a conflicting interest game,
because Alice prefers equilibrium a1a2a3b1b2b3 = 000001 with payoff (
5
9
, 1
9
) while
Bob prefers equilibrium a1a2a3b1b2b3 = 011111 with payoff (
1
9
, 5
9
).
The expected payoffs for Alice and Bob are
$A =
1
9
(2 · P 1100 + P 1111 + 2 · P 2100 + P 2111 + 2 · P 2200 + P 2211 + 2 · P 3200 + P 3211
+ 2 · P 3300 + P 3311 +
3
2
P 1301 +
3
2
P 1310 −
3
2
· 3), (17)
$B =
1
9
(P 1100 + 2 · P 1111 + P 2100 + 2 · P 2111 + P 2200 + 2 · P 2211 + P 3200 + 2 · P 3211
+ P 3300 + 2 · P 3311 +
3
2
P 1301 +
3
2
P 1310 −
3
2
· 3). (18)
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Table 4: Payoff matrix of our third game.
B1 B2 B3
A1
(2,1) (0,0) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (0,0) (3
2
, 3
2
)
(0,0) (1,2) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (3
2
, 3
2
) (0,0)
A2
(2,1) (0,0) (2,1) (0,0) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
)
(0,0) (1,2) (0,0) (1,2) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
)
A3
(- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (2,1) (0,0) (2,1) (0,0)
(- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (- 3
2
,- 3
2
) (0,0) (1,2) (0,0) (1,2)
The total payoff $A + $B is
1
6
C with
C =〈A1B1〉+ 〈A2B2〉+ 〈A3B3〉+ 〈A2B1〉+ 〈A3B2〉 − 〈A1B3〉, (19)
where
〈AiBj〉 = P ij00 + P ij11 − P ij01 − P ij10 = 2(P ij00 + P ij11)− 1. (20)
C is the left part of a generalized Bell inequality C 6 4 [15]. Thus $A+$B 6
2
3
.
By choosing appropriate measurements on a maximally entangled state of
two qubits, the players can achieve
C = 6 cos
pi
6
> 4. (21)
So players with quantum resource can obtain $A + $B =
1
6
C = cos pi
6
> 2
3
. At
the same time, $A = $B =
1
2
cos pi
6
, a fair allocation is achieved.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented three new conflicting interest Bayesian games
where quantum mechanics offers advantages. The first game is linked with Cere-
ceda inequalities, the second game is linked with a generalized Bell inequality
with 3 possible measurement outcomes, and the third game is linked with a
generalized Bell inequality with 3 possible measurement settings. The game
presented in Ref. [4] is also linked with Cereceda inequalities, but it’s not a
conflicting interest game. For that game each player’s payoff function corre-
sponds to a linear combination of Cereceda inequalities. However, for our first
game neither player’s payoff function corresponds to a linear combination of
Cereceda inequalities but the sum of their payoff functions does. Similarly, for
the first conflicting game presented in Ref. [12], neither player’s payoff function
corresponds to a linear combination of CHSH inequalities [17], but the sum of
their payoff functions corresponds to a CHSH inequality. This may explain the
rise of conflicting interests. This paper may contribute to our understanding of
both Bell nonlocality and Bayesian game theory, and may be useful in further
study on relevant topics.
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